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1. Introduction 
Motivated by the observation that many important economic decisions are made by teams rather than 
individuals, economics has recently witnessed a surge of interest in team decision making. Extending the 
existing psychology literature to domains of specific interest to economists, experimenters have 
established that team choices are generally more rational and more self-interested than individual choices 
(e.g., Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Blinder and Morgan, 2005; Kocher and 
Sutter, 2005; Charness and Jackson, 2007; Luhan, Kocher, and Sutter, 2009; Casari, Zhang, and Jackson, 
2016; Charness and Sutter, 2012; Kugler, Kausel, and Kocher, 2012).  An issue these studies place little 
emphasis upon is the internal organization of teams. More specifically, a universal feature of existing 
studies is that team members are all engaged in the same task. While appropriate for establishing basic 
observations about how teams perform relative to individuals, use of homogenous tasks departs 
significantly from the reality of many team environments. Team members in most environments are 
filling different roles and completing different tasks with different levels of difficulty. Not all team 
members are equally well suited for all tasks, so getting the right person assigned to the right role can be 
an important determinant of team success.   
Our study focuses on how the process of assigning teammates to roles affects performance, 
comparing random role assignment with allowing team members to agree among themselves on role 
assignments.  Giving team members input on the assignment of roles has clear informational benefits, 
since they are likely to know more about their abilities than any outside observer and therefore do better 
at getting the right person assigned to each role.  Holding role assignments fixed, letting team members 
have a say in choosing roles could affect their performance in several additional ways.  Conventional 
wisdom holds that increasing employee involvement improves performance by increasing intrinsic 
motivation.
2
 This implies that giving team members input on the assignment of roles will have a positive 
                                                 
2
 See Ichniowski and Shaw (1999) for empirical evidence of the positive effect of employee involvement.   
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effect on performance.  However, some roles may be more desirable than others.  If having to agree to 
roles leads to open disagreement or unvoiced discomfort with the implied conflict of choosing winners 
and losers, the effect of allowing team members to have a say in team assignment might be negative 
rather than positive (controlling for role assignment).  Even in the absence of conflict and emotional 
pressure, forcing team members to focus on assigning roles in addition may distract them from their tasks 
and therefore harm their performance.    
We examine role assignment in a setting where one role is more demanding than the other, making 
proper role assignment crucial for the success of a team. We find that endogenous role assignment does 
not improve team performance relative to random role assignment.  Underlying this are two effects of 
endogenous role assignment that almost perfectly counter-balance: the likelihood that the more able 
teammate is assigned the more demanding role increases with endogenous role assignment, reflecting the 
informational benefits of endogenous role assignment, but at the same time endogenous role assignment 
damages the performance of individuals assigned to the more demanding role due to negative 
psychological and emotional effects. 
Getting into the details, our subjects play a simplified version of the takeover game (Samuelson and 
Bazerman, 1985). This game has a Buyer and a Seller. The Seller has a single item to sell. She knows the 
value of this item while the Buyer only knows the distribution of values and that the value of the item to 
the Buyer is always 150 percent of the value to the Seller. The Seller’s payoff maximizing strategy is 
trivial: she should accept any bid greater than her value. Because of the asymmetric information between 
Buyers and Sellers concerning the item’s value, the Buyer faces adverse selection. In choosing a bid he 
needs to understand that the expected value of the item conditional on having his bid accepted is less than 
the expected value ex ante. The adverse selection is sufficiently severe that submitting a bid equal to the 
lowest possible value is the Buyer’s expected payoff maximizing strategy.  
Previous work on the takeover game has focused on why the winner’s curse (over-bidding) occurs, 
but we use the takeover game to understand how task assignment affects team performance.  The takeover 
game has two features that make it valuable as a lab environment for studying role assignment. First, the 
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Buyer and Seller roles differ greatly in difficulty. The Seller’s optimal strategy is trivial, but previous 
work has established that Buyers have a great deal of difficulty understanding that they need to bid low 
due to adverse selection (e.g., Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer and Bazerman, 2007; Bereby-Meyer and 
Grosskopf, 2008; Charness and Levin, 2009).  Second, performance in the takeover game is known to 
improve when the Buyer role is played by a group (Casari et al., 2016).
3
 This allows us to study the 
relationship between the importance of role assignment and the degree of interaction between teammates, 
specifically whether the method of role assignment matters more when team members can work together 
than when they operate independently. In the four main treatments of our experimental design, subjects 
are matched into teams of two players each. One teammate plays exclusively as a Buyer and the other 
plays exclusively as a Seller. Each plays a series of takeover games against Buyers and Sellers from other 
teams and split their earnings evenly. Teammates never play against each other, so their interests are 
perfectly aligned. The four treatments with teams systematically vary along two dimensions: (1) the 
Buyer and Seller roles are either assigned randomly and exogenously or are endogenously agreed upon by 
the two teammates, and (2) teammates either play independently, only interacting through their shared 
payoffs, or are given periodic opportunities to chat about how to play the game. Ex ante, we expect either 
endogenous role assignment or chat between teammates to improve the Buyers’ performance by lowering 
bids. 
We find that chat leads to significantly lower bids as expected. Endogenous role assignment has little 
effect, raising (rather than lowering) bids by a small amount that is far from statistical significance.  This 
is surprising since our data has all the necessary conditions for endogenous role assignment to lower bids.  
Bids from the initial phase should provide a clear measure of ability, and the data confirms that bids are 
significantly lower in the second phase when the more able teammate (i.e., the lower bidder in the first 
                                                 
3
 In Casari et al. (2016) groups consist of three members who are all in the role of buyers (while sellers were 
computerized). Their paper does not focus on role assignment and how it affects team performance.  Our version 
of the takeover game resembles their easy task where teams outperform individuals. 
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phase) is assigned to the Buyer role.  As expected, endogenous role assignment generates selection in 
favor of more able subjects taking the Buyer role, with subjects who bid lower than their teammates in the 
first phase being significantly more likely to be assigned the Buyer role in the second phase.  The problem 
is that Buyers who are endogenously assigned this role bid significantly higher in the second phase, 
controlling for ability, than Buyers who are randomly assigned this role.  This unexpected effect more 
than reverses the positive effects of selection in favor of more able subjects. The dialogues between 
teammates provide direct evidence that endogenous role assignment negatively affects the quality of the 
discussion between teammates on how to play the game. 
The negative effect of endogenous role assignment on Buyers’ performance, controlling for ability, 
is the primary result of our paper.  In two follow-up treatments, we tried to gain insights into why 
endogenous role assignment had negative, rather than positive, effects.  Our first hypothesis was that the 
negative effect of endogenous role assignment was due to cognitive load.  The intuition is straight 
forward.  Individuals only have a limited budget of cognitive resources available.  Adding a task that 
requires use of these resources necessarily leaves less for other tasks, leading to less rational behavior 
(Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1970).  To test this hypothesis, we ran a first follow-up treatment in which 
teammates were given two demanding logic puzzles to solve for a monetary award, thus increasing 
cognitive load.  Subjects spent a large amount of time working on the puzzles and discussion of how to 
bid was reduced even more than with endogenous role assignment.  As with endogenous role assignment, 
Buyers bid higher, controlling for ability, in the logic puzzle treatment.  This effect, however, is less than 
half the effect of endogenous role assignment and is not statistically significant.  Cognitive load may 
explain part of the effect of endogenous role assignment, but is unlikely to be the full explanation.  
Our second conjecture was that endogenous role assignment triggers negative feelings on the part of 
Buyers, since they have been assigned the more demanding role, diminishing the perceived importance of 
thinking hard about how to bid.  To test for negative psychological and emotional effects of endogenous 
role assignment, we ran a second follow-up treatment.  Teams were able to chat and assign roles 
endogenously, but after the role selection we paused for almost half an hour to conduct several 
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questionnaires. These addressed two main sets of questions: First, does endogenous role selection 
generate selection into the Buyer role on individual characteristics beyond those related to bidding 
behavior in the first part of the experiment?  We focus on psychological characteristics such as 
overconfidence, risk preferences, positive and negative reciprocity, a desire for control, and self-efficacy.  
Second, are there differences in the emotional state of Buyers and Sellers?  For example, do Buyers feel 
happier with their role than Sellers?  Do Buyers feel more pressure than Sellers or more responsible? 
We find that subjects who select into the Buyer role are significantly more likely to want to punish 
people who have harmed them (negative reciprocity).  The emotional states of the two roles also differ, 
with Buyers feeling less happy, less joyful, and more envious.  Directly related to role selection, Buyers 
put less value than Sellers on their chosen role.   
With endogenous role assignment, it is the Seller, not chance, who bears responsibility for Buyers 
getting the more demanding role.  Even though we observe little open conflict when roles are being 
assigned, subjects assigned endogenously to the Buyer role are unhappy about it and inclined to punish 
people who have harmed them.  While we don’t think Buyers are purposefully sabotaging Sellers, it is 
easy to imagine that they aren’t terribly motivated to try their hardest to figure out the best bidding 
strategy.  Hence, we conclude that endogenous role assignment puts an emotional strain on Buyers which 
leads to worse bidding behavior.  
We proceed as follows: Section 2 describes the takeover game, and section 3 introduces the 
experimental design. Section 4 presents our hypotheses, and section 5 the experimental results. Section 6 
is devoted to our two follow-up treatments, and section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Takeover Game 
Subjects in our experiment played a simplified version of the takeover game. This game involves two 
individuals, a Buyer and a Seller. The game begins with the Seller drawing a value, V, for an indivisible 
item. This is the amount the item is worth to her. The possible values are 90, 600, and 1200 experimental 
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points, with each value equally likely to be drawn. The Seller knows the value of the item while the Buyer 
only knows the distribution of values. The Buyer submits a bid, B, to purchase the item, where bids are 
restricted to the set of integers between 0 and 2000 (inclusive). The Seller observes the bid and chooses to 
either accept or reject it. If the bid is accepted, the Buyer’s profit is 1.5*V – B and the Seller’s profit is B 
– V. If the bid is rejected, both players’ profits are zero. 
The Seller’s optimal strategy is simple – she should accept a bid if it is (weakly) greater than the 
value and reject otherwise. The Buyer’s optimal bid is less obvious. If the Seller is behaving optimally, 
the Buyer’s expected payoff maximizing bid is 90. This is also the optimal bid for a risk averse buyer. In 
evaluating the profitability of a bid, the Buyer has to consider the expected value of the item subject to the 
bid being accepted. In other words, the Buyer must account for adverse selection. Table 1 illustrates the 
basic features of the Buyer’s problem. A bid of 1200 induces all Sellers to accept the bid, including those 
with low (V = 90) and medium (V = 600) values. Because the expected value of an item is only 630 
points, even after a 50 percent mark-up it isn’t worth enough to make the bid profitable. The expected loss 
is large, 255 points, and Buyers lose money for two thirds of their bids. Similar reasoning for a medium 
bid of 600 yields an expected loss of 82.5 points. Unlike a high bid, however, feedback isn’t going to 
make it obvious that a bid of 600 is a bad idea, because bids make money as often as they lose money and 
the expected loss isn’t enormous. Learning to bid 90 is going to be difficult unless the Buyer recognizes 
the adverse selection problem and realizes that the only way to avoid losing money is to bid at the lowest 
possible value. 
Table 1 about here 
 
3. Experimental Design 
Our experiment consisted of two parts. The first part, covering Rounds 1 – 10, was identical in all 
treatments. The second part (Rounds 11 – 40) differed across treatments. The initial instructions explained 
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only Part 1, including three questions to check for understanding (see the appendix for the instructions). 
Instructions for Part 2 were distributed after the conclusion of Part 1.  
In Part 1, all subjects were in the role of Buyers. Sellers were computerized and always sold the 
indivisible item if the Buyer’s bid was equal to or larger than the item’s value in a given period. Buyers 
knew about this rule. Each subject received starting capital of 12 Euros (3000 experimental points) for 
Part 1 from which possible losses could be covered.
4
 After each round, subjects got feedback about the 
item’s value, whether they had bought the item or not, and how large their profit was. 
In Part 2 we introduced five different treatments which are explained in the following. 
1) Control. In this treatment, Rounds 11 – 40 were identical in structure to Rounds 1 – 10. Hence, 
all subjects remained in the role of Buyers, and Sellers were computerized. This treatment serves 
as a control for the possible effects of forming pairs of Buyers and Sellers in the other treatments. 
Buyers received an additional 10 Euros (2500 experimental points) of capital at the start of Part 2. 
2) No Chat - Random. Here – and in the other treatments remaining to be introduced – we 
randomly assigned pairs of subjects to be teammates at the beginning of Part 2. In the No Chat - 
Random treatment, one teammate was randomly assigned to the role of Buyer in Rounds 11 – 40, 
and the other was assigned to the role of Seller. Subjects were informed about their roles before 
Round 11, and roles were fixed throughout Part 2. In this treatment and in the others to follow, a 
Buyer never played the takeover game against the Seller who was his teammate. This was 
                                                 
4
 The 21 subjects who finished Part 1 with a negative balance, in spite of the starting capital, were allowed to 
continue to Part 2. These subjects were told that their Part 1 losses could be recouped in Part 2. Since all subjects 
received additional starting capital at the beginning of Part 2, only four Buyers started Part 2 with a net negative 
balance. If someone still had a loss after Part 2, it was not enforced. This was never mentioned in advance. There 
were 34 subjects (5.7 percent) who ended the experiment in the red. The majority of these subjects (21 of 33) 
come from the Control treatment. Note that excluding Buyers in the red from our main regression (Model 2 in 
Table 2) would not change any of the insights reported there. 
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common knowledge. Before Round 11 started, subjects in both roles were asked to enter some 
information about them that was then shown to their teammate (see Table A.1 in the online 
Appendix). This information included age, gender, field of study, population of the hometown, 
working status, experience in experiments, grades in math and German from high school exit 
exams (“Maturanoten”), and total profit in Part 1. They were not shown the bids and values that 
led to the Part 1 profits. Other than this exchange of information, there was no opportunity for 
communication within a team. 
For Part 2, Buyers received 10 Euros (2500 experimental points) as additional starting capital, 
and Sellers received 2 Euros (500 experimental points). The total profits of a team’s Buyer and 
Seller in Part 2, including the starting capital, were divided equally between the teammates at the 
end of Part 2. This feature was stressed in the instructions for Part 2.
5
 Because teammates never 
played each other and shared payoffs, their incentives were aligned.  The Buyers’ feedback after 
each period in Part 2 was the same as in Part 1. Sellers got as feedback the bid of the Buyer with 
whom they were paired in a given period, the item’s value, whether the Seller had sold the item, 
and the resulting profit. Subjects did not receive feedback about their teammate’s outcome. 
3) Chat - Random. This treatment is identical to No Chat - Random, except that before Rounds 
11, 21, and 31, the Buyer and the Seller in a team were allowed to chat with each other through 
an instant messaging program. The chat was restricted to five minutes (before rounds 11, 21, and 
31), which pilot sessions indicated was more than adequate time for a full discussion of the 
relevant issues such as which strategy to play. 
4) No Chat – Endogenous. This treatment differs from No Chat - Random only in the way the 
roles within each team were determined, but is identical in every other respect. After seeing the 
information (age, gender, etc.) about the other member of the team, each member could make 
                                                 
5
 We, nevertheless, used the 10 Euros starting capital for Buyers (and 2 Euros for Sellers) in order to keep the 
conditions for Buyers identical across treatments, because in Control they also received 10 Euros for Part 2. 
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proposals about how to assign roles. Proposals could be accompanied by one of the following 
preset reasons: (i) because one member did better in Part 1, (ii) because a particular role was 
easier to play, (iii), because a particular role was more fun, and (iv) because a subject did not like 
to take risks. These four reasons were the most common justifications for wanting a particular 
role in the Chat-Endogenous treatment (see below).  Subjects were free to send as many messages 
back and forth as they wanted within a two-minute window.  The idea was to let subjects 
communicate about role assignment, as in Chat-Endogenous, but to eliminate any possibility of 
discussing how to bid.  After the two minutes for communication were over, subjects had to 
simultaneously enter which role they wanted. If both teammates entered the same role, the role 
assignment was randomly determined. Otherwise, roles were assigned as requested by the 
teammates. 
5) Chat – Endogenous. This treatment is identical to Chat - Random, except that roles were 
determined endogenously within each team, following the same procedure as in No Chat - 
Endogenous. Before role selection before Round 11, teammates could chat for five minutes as in 
Chat – Random. 
The experiment was run with a total of 592 participants, all of them students at the University of 
Innsbruck. Recruitment was done using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), and the sessions were computerized 
with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). We had 112 participants in Control, and 120 in each of the other four 
treatments. No subject participated in more than one session. On average, an experimental session lasted 
about 90 minutes. The average earnings per subject were 17 Euros. 
 
4. Hypotheses 
A bid of 90 maximizes expected value assuming no errors on the part of Sellers.  Only bids in the range 
90 ≤ B < 135 have positive expected value and we define these bids as “optimal bids”.  Most optimal 
bids are in the lower part of this range; 93 percent of optimal bids are in the range 90 – 100. 
A
cc
ep
te
d
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
11 
 
Comparing the Control and No Chat – Random treatments, differences in bidding can occur 
because Buyers in the No Chat – Random treatment share their payoffs with a teammate or because 
computerized Sellers do not make errors while humans potentially do.  The latter possibility can largely 
be dismissed, as documented in Section 5.2.  Sharing payoffs could lead to more substantial differences in 
bidding.  Suppose that the effort spent on figuring out how to bid optimally is costly.  If we assume that 
our subjects are largely self-regarding (i.e., put little weight on the payoffs of others), the rewards from 
learning to bid optimally are larger when Buyers keep their entire payoff rather than sharing it with a 
teammate. Combined with effort costs, this implies that bids will be lower in the Control treatment than 
in No Chat – Random. 
Hypothesis 1: Bids will be lower in Rounds 11 – 40 of the Control treatment than in No Chat – Random. 
In treatments with chat, the Buyer and Seller in a team get multiple possibilities to discuss bidding. If 
the Seller has learned to bid optimally and understands why this is a good strategy (i.e., understands the 
adverse selection), she should communicate her insights to the Buyer since profits are shared. Even if the 
Buyer has not previously learned to bid optimally, he should recognize the optimal strategy when it is 
explained to him and bid optimally in the future. This is the essence of the “truth-wins” model of team 
decision making pioneered by Lorge and Solomon (1955). Although the truth-wins model is often too 
optimistic about the performance of teams, experimental studies by economists and psychologists 
universally find that teams outperform individuals at solving these types of problems since at least some 
useful sharing of insights takes place between teammates.
6
 This implies that bids will be lower in 
treatments with chat (assuming that subjects use the opportunities of exchanging information and insights 
in the chat) than the corresponding treatments without chat.
 
 
                                                 
6
 For summaries of the psychology literature, see Davis (1992) and Kerr and Tindale (2004). Evidence from 
economic experiments studying play of games includes Cooper and Kagel (2005, 2009, and 2012), Casari et al. 
(2016), and Charness et al. (2010).  For surveys, see Charness and Sutter (2012) and Kugler et al. (2012). 
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Hypothesis 2: Bids will be lower in Rounds 11 – 40 in treatments with chat than in treatments without 
chat. 
In the treatments with endogenous role assignment it is no longer random who receives the role of 
Buyer. If the goal is to make as much money as possible, the teammates should attempt to get the most 
able individual in the role of Buyer since the role of Seller is trivial and, as shall be seen, it matters little 
who fills this role. The teammates have access to an excellent indicator for who will do a better job as the 
Buyer – their earnings from the first ten rounds. There is high correlation between earnings in the first ten 
rounds and bidding low in the first ten rounds.
7
 If teams systematically pick the individual who earned 
more in Rounds 1 – 10 to be the Buyer for Rounds 11 – 40, we expect that they will on average bid lower 
and earn more in Rounds 11 – 40 than teams with randomly selected roles.  
Hypothesis 3: Bids will be lower in Rounds 11 – 40 in treatments with endogenous role assignment than 
in treatments with randomly assigned roles. 
 We have no clear prediction about how the effect of role assignment will vary when chat is or is 
not available.  On the one hand, having chat may strengthen the selection effect.  On the flip side, role 
assignment should be less important with endogenous role assignment in Chat – Endogenous.  If the 
Seller is more insightful than the Buyer, she can pass her insights along to the Buyer.  It therefore ought 
to matter less whether the more able individual becomes the Buyer.  These two effects have opposite 
signs.  Whether endogenous role assignment matters more with or without chat is an empirical question. 
 
5. Results 
5.1  Rounds 1 – 10: The cluster of bars on the left side of Figure 1 shows the distribution of bids for 
Rounds 1 – 10 in which all subjects in all treatments played as a Buyer. Bids have been broken into the 
                                                 
7
 The correlation between an individual’s average bid and average points earned in Rounds 1 – 10 is -0.599. This is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level (t = 17.54). 
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same seven categories used in Table 1 to show the logic of bidding a low amount. There are four 
categories (B < 90, 135 ≤ B < 600, 900 ≤ B < 1200, and B ≥ 1800) where the Buyer never earns 
money unless the Seller makes an error. Choices in these four categories are rare. The remaining three 
categories (90 ≤ B < 135, 600 ≤ B < 900, and 1200 ≤ B ≤ 1800) can make money if the right value is 
drawn, but only the first category (90 ≤ B < 135) has positive expected value. 
Figure 1 about here 
A little less than half of the bids are optimal (90 ≤ B < 135) in the first ten rounds. Many subjects 
immediately grasp the need to bid optimally, but many don’t. This is a scenario in which team play with 
communication should help since there will be many matches between an individual who doesn’t bid 
optimally with a subject who does. Of course, subjects don’t fall neatly into categories of those who “get 
it” and those who don’t. Only 10 percent of the subjects never bid optimally in Rounds 1 – 10 and only 17 
percent always bid optimally. Looking at gender effects, we find that men bid significantly lower than 
women (average bids of 366 vs. 425; p < 0.05). 
 
5.2  Sellers in Rounds 11 – 40: Underlying the hypotheses developed in Section 4 is an assumption that 
Sellers always behave optimally (in terms of maximizing monetary payoffs), accepting only bids that are 
at least as great as their value. In Control this happens by design, and suboptimal decisions by Sellers in 
the other four treatments are relatively rare. Define an error as rejecting a bid strictly greater than the 
item’s value or accepting a bid strictly less than the item’s value. Errors are observed for only 4 percent of 
observations in Rounds 11 – 40, with no difference across treatments with human sellers. Even with 
Sellers making this modest amount of errors it remains optimal to submit a bid in the range 90 ≤ B < 
135. 
 
5.3  Treatment Effects for Buyers: Figure 2a shows average bids by Buyers in all five treatments. The 
data is broken down into ten round blocks and data is included from Rounds 1 – 10, the rounds before the 
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treatments are in effect, to show the differing starting points for the treatments. The data for Rounds 1 – 
10 is taken from all subjects, including those who became Sellers in Rounds 11 – 40. 
Figure 2a and Figure 2b about here 
In Rounds 11 – 40, allowing chat unambiguously reduces bids. Bids are lower in Chat – Random 
than in No Chat – Random and lower in Chat – Endogenous than in No Chat - Endogenous.  The 
effect of endogenous role assignment in Rounds 11 – 40 is murkier.  Bids are higher in Chat – 
Endogenous than in Chat – Random, except for Rounds 31 – 40, and lower in No Chat – Endogenous 
than in No Chat – Random, except for Rounds 31 – 40.  In neither case are the differences especially 
large. 
Using bids as our primary measure implies an assumption that lower bids are always better. We have 
chosen this approach because it relies directly on the choices of Buyers as well as being simple and 
intuitive. That said, we thank a referee for noting that expected profits are not monotonic in bids.  For 
example, a bid of 550 has a lower expected profit than a bid of 650.  The non-monotonicity should not 
have much impact on our conclusions since only 3 percent of bids in rounds 11 – 40 are in non-monotonic 
zones, and there is a very high correlation between bids and expected profits (ρ = 0.9).  But for the sake of 
completeness, Figure 2b parallels Figure 2a, showing average expected profit for Buyers in each of the 
five treatments.  Note that average expected profits are always negative, reflecting the frequency of 
overbidding.  The differences between treatments parallel those shown in Figure 2a: higher expected 
profits with chat and a murky effect from endogenous role assignment. 
 Figures 3 and 4 illustrate two different ways in which endogenous role assignment could affect bids.  
First, endogenous role assignment is predicted to reduce bids relative to random role assignment because 
of selection.  Teammates who are better at the difficult problem of bidding should get the more 
challenging role of Buyer.  The best-case scenario is “perfect role assignment,” where the most able 
individual is always assigned the more critical role of Buyer.  Using bids in Rounds 1 – 10 as a proxy for 
ability as a Buyer, we simulate perfect role assignment by using data from the treatments with random 
role assignment and selecting only those teams where the low bidder in Rounds 1 – 10 is assigned the 
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Buyer role. This subsample provides a guide for how well endogenous role assignment would have 
performed if it had no effect on bidding (or learning about how to bid) and yielded perfect role 
assignment.   
Figure 3 displays average bids from the two treatments with random role assignment (solid lines) 
along with average bids from the subset of teams in these treatments where the low bidder in Rounds 1 – 
10 became the Buyer (dashed lines).  Arrows have been added to make it easier to see the effect of perfect 
versus random role assignment.    In both cases, perfect role assignment leads to far lower bids in Rounds 
11 – 40 than random role assignment.  If the only effect of endogenous role assignment was to always get 
the right teammate into the Buyer role (perfect role assignment), we should have seen a clear reduction in 
bids consistent with Hypothesis 3.    
Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here 
 Perfect role assignment is probably too much to hope for, but, as shown in Section 5.4, the 
endogenous role assignment treatments led to significant selection in favor of the teammate who bid less 
in Rounds 1 – 10.  The reason that the endogenous role assignment treatments do not reduce bids in 
Rounds 11 – 40 is because they also affect learning.  The effect of endogenous role assignment on 
learning is illustrated by Figure 4. This figure is based on bids from all treatments, except Control, by 
subjects assigned the roles of Buyers in Rounds 11 – 40. Treatments are paired by whether or not chat is 
available (No Chat – Random vs No Chat – Endogenous and Chat – Random vs. Chat – 
Endogenous) to isolate effects due to endogenous role assignment. For the treatments with random role 
assignment the graph shows average bids.  For the treatments with endogenous role assignment, the 
average bids in Rounds 1 – 10 are adjusted to equal those in the paired treatment with random role 
assignment.  (The starting points for the two treatments with random role assignment were very similar, 
so it appears that the four treatments are starting at the same point.)  In subsequent ten round blocks the 
average bids are changed as they did in the real data from the endogenous role assignment treatments.  
Figure 4 therefore shows how the data would evolve if endogenous role assignment had no effect on role 
assignment (yielding equal starting positions), leaving only the effect on learning.  Arrows have again 
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been added to make it easier to see the negative effects of endogenous role assignment.  Endogenous role 
assignment slows the learning process both with and without chat, counteracting the positive effect of 
better role assignment.  This unexpected effect of endogenous role assignment drives the most surprising 
result of our paper, the failure of Hypothesis 3. 
Table 2 about here 
 The regressions reported in Table 2 are designed to analyze the data in more detail. The dataset for 
these regressions includes all observations from our data. The dependent variable for Models 1, 2, 4, and 
5 is the amount bid by the Buyer.  To check whether our main results are robust to changing the measure 
of Buyers’ performance, Models 3 and 6 use the Buyer’s expected profits as the dependent variable.  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 An obvious feature of the data is strong individual effects. To correct for these, all of the models use a 
linear specification with fixed effects. The fixed effects are identified from choices in Rounds 1 – 10, 
before any of the treatments take effect. The first row of Table 2 identifies the unit being used for the 
fixed effects: Models 1 and 4 use fixed effects identified from early choices (Rounds 1 – 10) by both 
members of a team while Models 2, 3, 5, and 6 use fixed effects based only on early choices by the 
teammate who ended up in the Buyer role for Rounds 11 – 40. The different methods allow us to isolate 
how much of the observed treatment effects are due to changes in the learning process. If the fixed effects 
are at the team level (Models 1 and 4), the estimated effects of endogenous role assignment include the 
impact through selection (i.e., better role assignment) and the impact through changes in the learning 
process.  The estimated differences in Models 1 and 4 parallel those observed in Figure 2a.   
When the fixed effects are at the Buyer level (Models 2, 3, 5, and 6), the estimated treatment effects 
only reflect effects due to changes in the learning process since the regression now accounts for the 
differing behavior of Buyers and Sellers in Rounds 1 – 10 with endogenous role assignment.  In other 
words, Models 2, 3, 5, and 6 control for improved role assignment.  The estimated treatment effects in 
Models 2 and 5 are analogous to those shown in Figure 4.   
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Models 1, 2, and 3 are basic regressions checking whether the effects of chat and endogenous role 
assignment are significant.  A dummy is included for Rounds 11 – 40 as well as interactions between the 
dummy for Rounds 11 – 40 and dummies for the Control treatment, the treatments with chat (Chat – 
Random and Chat – Endogenous), and the treatments with endogenous role assignment (No Chat – 
Endogenous and Chat – Endogenous). These interaction terms are the critical variables that allow us to 
test Hypotheses 1 – 3.8 
The results of Models 1 and 2 provide little support for Hypothesis 1. Bids in Rounds 11 – 40 are 
lower in the Control treatment than in the No Chat – Random treatment, but the effect is weak and not 
statistically significant. Hypothesis 2 receives strong support from the data, as bids in Rounds 11 – 40 are 
significantly lower in the treatments with chat for both Models 1 and 2. The big surprise is how badly 
Hypothesis 3 does.  If this hypothesis is correct, the estimate for “Rounds 11 – 40 * Endogenous Roles” 
should be negative and significant in Model 1 where the effects of selection work in favor of finding a 
reduction in bids due to endogenous role assignment. Instead, the estimated effect in Model 1 is small and 
positive.  When effects due to selection are eliminated by having fixed effects at the Buyer level (Model 
2), the effect of endogenous role assignment on bids for Rounds 11 – 40 becomes significant and positive. 
Combining the results from Models 1 and 2, the benefits of selection with endogenous role assignment 
are more than counter-balanced by the unexpected harmful effects on learning.
9
 Model 3 tells a similar 
story to Model 2, showing a positive effect of chat and a negative effect of endogenous role assignment 
on expected profits.  Hence, our conclusions do not depend critically on how the performance of Buyers 
is measured. 
                                                 
8
 The interaction with the dummy for Rounds 11 - 40 is necessary to avoid collinearity with the fixed effects. 
9
 The floor on bids could distort our estimates since subjects who learn to bid optimally in Rounds 1 – 10 have 
nothing left to learn in Rounds 11 – 40.  To control for this, we count the number of optimal bids per Buyer in 
Rounds 1 – 10 and rerun Model 2 with this added variable (interacted with a dummy for Rounds 11 – 40).  The 
new control variable is significant, but the estimate for “Rounds 11 – 40 * Endogenous Roles” remains positive 
and significant at the 5 percent level as in Model 2.  The floor on bids does not drive our main result. 
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Models 4, 5, and 6 modify Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively, by adding controls for the Buyers’ 
demographic characteristics: gender (0 = male, 1 = female), age, math score, and German score.  For the 
math and German scores, lower numbers indicate better grades.  All of these variables are interacted with 
the dummy for Part 2 (Rounds 11 – 40) to avoid collinearity with the fixed effects. The results of Models 
4 and 5 parallel those of Models 1 and 2 as far as Hypotheses 1 – 3 are concerned. Looking at the 
estimates for the demographic variables, gender is negative and significant.  This doesn’t mean that 
women bid lower than men in Rounds 11 – 40, but rather that women are catching up over time.  Recall 
that women bid significantly higher than men in Rounds 1 – 10, but in Rounds 11 – 40, average bids are 
essentially identical for men and women (296 for men vs. 299 for women).  None of the other 
demographic variables are statistically significant.  The results in Model 6 are similar to those in Model 5.  
Of greatest interest, the effect of endogenous role assignment on expected profits is negative and 
significant.  One difference is that the estimated effect of chat, while little changed in magnitude from 
Model 3, is not statistically significant.   
We summarize the results up to this point by revisiting our initial hypotheses. The following 
conclusions refer to bids and expected profits in Rounds 11 – 40. 
Conclusion 1: Bids are lower and expected profits higher in the Control treatment than in the No Chat – 
Random treatment, but the differences are generally small and not statistically significant. We find little 
support for Hypothesis 1. 
Conclusion 2: Bids are lower and expected profits higher in treatments with chat than in the 
corresponding treatments without chat.  This result is stronger from a statistical point of view for bids 
than expected profits. The data supports Hypothesis 2. 
Conclusion 3: Bids are higher and expected profits lower in treatments with endogenous role assignment 
than in the corresponding treatments with random role assignment.  This difference is significant when 
effects due to changes in the learning process are isolated. The data provides no support for Hypothesis 
3, and instead indicates that endogenous role assignment harms the ability of Buyers to learn the optimal 
bidding strategy. 
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5.4  Comparing Buyers to Sellers in the Endogenous Role Assignment Treatments: This subsection 
examines more closely how roles are assigned in the two treatments with endogenous role assignment. 
Table 3 compares Buyers and Sellers by showing the median values of individual characteristics (except 
for gender where we report the proportion of women) broken down by role and treatment. Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests are used to test the significance of differences between Buyers and Sellers. The 
demographic characteristics do not differ significantly between Buyers and Sellers with one exception: 
women are less likely to become Buyers in No Chat – Endogenous with the difference being weakly 
significant.  The final two rows of Table 3 show average bids and expected profits in Rounds 1 – 10. 
Endogenous role assignment systematically puts the teammate who did a better job of bidding in Rounds 
1 – 10 into the Buyer role.  For 41 of 58 pairs (71 percent) in No Chat – Endogenous and 39 of 60 pairs 
(65 percent) in Chat – Endogenous, the subject who bid less in Rounds 1 – 10 became the Buyer.10  The 
results are weaker for expected profits, as expected profits are higher for Buyers in both treatments but the 
difference is not significant for Chat – Endogenous.  Hypothesis 3 is based on an assumption that 
endogenous role assignment leads to more able individuals being selected into the Buyer role.  This 
underlying assumption holds for both treatments with endogenous role assignment, but more strongly for 
No Chat – Endogenous than Chat - Endogenous.  In Section 4 we predicted that chat improves role 
assignment, but this is not true.   
Table 3 about here 
Conclusion 4: In both treatments with endogenous role assignment, Buyers bid less and have higher 
expected profits in Rounds 1 – 10 than the Sellers they are paired with.  Selection into roles is stronger in 
the absence of chat. 
 
                                                 
10
 There were two pairs in No Chat – Endogenous where the average bids were identical for both teammates in 
Rounds 1 – 10. 
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5.5  Does It Matter Who Becomes the Buyer?  It would matter little whether Buyers bid less than 
Sellers for Rounds 1 – 10 if teams performed the same regardless of which teammate took which role. 
Figure 5 shows otherwise. This figure compares the average bid in Rounds 11 – 40 for teams where the 
teammate who bid (strictly) lower on average in Rounds 1 – 10 becomes the Buyer with teams where the 
teammate who bid lower becomes the Seller. 
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
The average bid for Rounds 11 – 40 is lower when the teammate who bid lower in Rounds 1 – 10 is 
given the role of Buyer.  The effect is stronger in the treatments without chat (left-hand side of Figure 5) 
than in those with chat (right-hand side), consistent with our prediction from Section 4 that role 
assignment should be less important with chat since a Seller who understands the benefits of bidding low 
can pass this understanding on to the Buyer.  
Table 4 about here 
 The regressions shown in Table 4 put the preceding observations on a firm statistical footing.  Both 
models include data from all four treatments with teams.  The dependent variable is a team’s average bid 
for Rounds 11 – 40 in Model 1 and a team’s average expected profit for Rounds 11 – 40 in Model 2, 
yielding a single observation per team.
11
 The independent variables are a dummy for the treatments with 
chat, an interaction between a dummy for treatments without chat and a dummy for teams where the 
Buyer is the teammate with lower average bids (higher average expected profits) in Rounds 1 – 10, and an 
interaction between a dummy for treatments with chat and a dummy for teams where the Buyer is the 
teammate with lower average bids (higher average expected profits) in Rounds 1 – 10. The parameter 
estimate for the first interaction term is large and significant at the 1 percent level in both models. Not 
                                                 
11
 The fixed effect approach used in Table 2 isn’t feasible here, since the fixed effects would be collinear with the 
independent variables. 
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surprisingly, bids and expected profits in Rounds 11 – 40 are very sensitive to the Buyer’s identity when 
the teammates cannot communicate. The parameter estimate for the second interaction term is smaller, 
but still significant. Consistent with our impression from Figure 5, who becomes the Buyer is less 
important when teammates can chat, but still matters. 
 
Conclusion 5: Both without and with chat, teams where the Buyer bid lower (had higher expected profits) 
than the Seller in Rounds 1 – 10 have lower bids in Rounds 11 – 40. 
 
5.6  Content of Conversations: When Buyers are randomly selected, chat improves the quality of 
bidding, albeit less than the truth wins model would suggest.  Given that the more able teammate, as 
measured by bids in Rounds 1 – 10, generally ends up as the Buyer in the Chat – Endogenous treatment, 
we would expect that bids would be even lower in this treatment than in the Chat – Random treatment. 
The fact that bids are higher in the Chat – Endogenous treatment, significantly so if we control for 
selection into the Buyer role, suggests that something must be going wrong in the interaction between 
teammates. To determine what exactly causes the problem, we turn to the content of the conversation 
between teammates. 
We focus on the conversations that took place between Round 10 and Round 11.  As can be seen in 
Figure 4, this is where the major divergence between the two chat treatments occurs. Recall that subjects 
were given five minutes to discuss how to bid and (when relevant) role assignment.  They could not move 
on to the next stage of the experiment until the five minutes had elapsed. We coded every team for 
whether they discussed how to bid and, as a subcategory of this, if they specifically discussed the benefits 
of optimal bids. The coding was initially done independently by two research assistants. We then had the 
two coders discuss all the discrepancies in the coding and agree on a single decision for coding. Using a 
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single coding simplifies our discussion of the chat content but has little effect on our conclusions since 
there was a high degree of agreement between the two initial codings.
12
 
Subjects indeed chatted extensively, with the average team sending 25.0 messages during the five 
minutes. There is no significant difference in the quantity of messages between Chat – Random (26.2 
messages) and Chat – Endogenous (23.8). Looking at what teams said, however, we see significant 
differences between the two chat treatments.  More teams discussed how to bid in Chat – Random than 
Chat – Endogenous (78 percent vs. 61 percent; p < 0.05), and, even stronger, more teams specifically 
discussed optimal bidding in Chat – Random  than in Chat – Endogenous (63 percent vs. 35 percent; p 
< 0.01). 
The relative failure of teams in the Chat – Endogenous treatment to discuss bidding, especially 
bidding low, provides a partial explanation for why bids are significantly higher than in the Chat – 
Random treatment after controlling for selection into the Buyer role. With Buyer fixed effects, the 
estimated difference between the two chat treatments in Rounds 11 – 40 is 89.22 with a robust standard 
error of 45.80 (see Table A.2 in the online appendix). If this regression is modified to include a control for 
whether the team discussed optimal bidding, the estimated difference drops to 46.90 with a robust 
standard error of 44.76. The difference between the treatments is halved and is no longer statistically 
significant. This crude control for what is said between Rounds 10 and 11 accounts for a large fraction of 
the higher bids in Chat – Endogenous relative to Chat – Random. 
 
Conclusion 6: Teams in Chat – Endogenous are significantly less likely to discuss bidding, and are 
significantly less likely to discuss optimal bids than teams in Chat – Random. Controlling for differences 
in chat content explains a large fraction of why bids are significantly higher in Chat – Endogenous than 
in Chat – Random after controlling for selection. 
                                                 
12
 The cross-coder correlation was 0.55 for the category “discussed how to bid” and 0.49 for “bidding low”, both 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
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The teammate who bid lower in Rounds 1 – 10 was more likely to become the Buyer in Chat - 
Endogenous (39 of 60 teams), but this was far from universal. The message content helps explain why 
the low bidder did not always become the Buyer. Almost all of the teams (54/60) in Chat – Endogenous 
discussed which teammate should be the Buyer, but the discussions of role assignment are typically brief 
and often miss basic points. Few teams (9/60) discussed performance in Rounds 1 – 10 as a reason for 
assigning roles. Not only did endogenous role assignment harm teams’ discussion of how to bid, but they 
also had low quality discussions about who should be the Buyer. 
 
6. Explaining Poor Performance with Endogenous Role Assignment 
The most surprising result in our initial set of experiments was the poor performance of Buyers with 
endogenous role assignment.  The remainder of the paper explores possible reasons for this result by 
presenting two additional treatments.  Cognitive load provides one plausible explanation for this effect.  
Buyers face a challenging intellectual problem.  Having subjects responsible for assigning roles increases 
their cognitive load.  With less cognitive resources available to think about bidding, Buyers might do a 
poor job of learning to bid optimally.  The reduced discussion of optimal bidding in Chat - Endogenous 
is consistent with this explanation. 
Therefore, we ran a first additional treatment testing the hypothesis that cognitive load drives the 
negative effect of endogenous role assignment.  The Nonogram treatment was identical to the Chat – 
Random treatment except for one detail.  After Round 10 and prior to the start of chat, subjects were told 
that they would be given two nonograms (a type of logic puzzle) to solve and that they could work on 
them during the chat period of five minutes.  Subjects were paid one euro for each puzzle solved 
correctly.   
Figures 6 and 7 about here 
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Nonograms are a type of grid-based logic puzzle.  They serve as a good task to induce cognitive load 
as they are challenging, but with rules simple enough to be learned quickly.  Figure 6 shows a 6 x 6 
nonogram.  Initially, subjects only see the blank cells inside the 6 x 6 grid. The task is to mark each cell 
with an “X” or leave it unmarked. For reference, since teammates could talk about the puzzles, rows are 
indexed by Roman numerals and columns are indexed by letters.  Labels with Arabic numerals indicate 
the length of each run of consecutive marked cells, according to the solution, in each row and column.  
The “X”s inside the 6 x 6 grid show the correctly solved puzzle. As in Chat – Endogenous, the task 
presumed to increase cognitive load takes place at the same time team members are chatting with each 
other and serves as an alternate topic of discussion to discussing the bidding strategy. 
Figure 7 about here 
Six sessions were run of Nonogram, with twenty subjects per session, none of whom had participated 
in any of the other treatments.  We hypothesized that, controlling for Buyer fixed effects, bids in Rounds 
11 - 40 would be higher in Nonogram than Chat – Random.  More importantly, we hypothesized that 
bids would be at least as high as in Chat – Endogenous.  Nonograms are a challenging intellectual task.  
If having to choose roles affects bidding primarily by reducing the cognitive resources available to think 
about and discuss bidding, solving nonograms should have a similar effect.  We predicted a negative 
effect on discussion of bidding, paralleling the effect documented for Chat – Endogenous, and a similar 
delay in learning relative to Chat – Random. 
Subjects spent substantial effort on the puzzles, averaging 1.28 puzzles solved, and many teams (40 
percent) used the chat to talk about the puzzles.  As predicted, teams discussed their bidding strategy less 
frequently than in either Chat – Random or Chat - Endogenous.  In Chat – Random, 78 percent of 
teams discussed bidding with 63 percent specifically mentioning optimal bidding.  These figures dropped 
to 61 percent and 35 percent in Chat – Endogenous.  The decrease is even more precipitous in 
Nonogram, as only 48 percent of teams discuss bids and only 30 percent bring up optimal bidding.  If 
reduced discussion of bidding can be taken as a good proxy for the amount of thought devoted to bidding, 
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this suggests that the effect of solving nonograms due to increased cognitive load should be at least as 
large as the effect of endogenous role assignment due to increased cognitive load.  
Figure 7 compares bids from Nonogram with bids in the other two treatments with chat. The 
construction of Figure 7 parallels that of Figure 4.  It shows average bids of subjects assigned the Buyer 
role for Rounds 11 – 40.  The average bids in Rounds 1 – 10 are adjusted to equal those in Chat – 
Random.  In subsequent ten round blocks the average bids are changed as they did in the real data.  
Figure 7 therefore shows how the data would have evolved if the treatments had no effect on role 
assignment (yielding equal starting positions), leaving only the effect on learning.  Both Chat – 
Endogenous and Nonogram increase bids relative to Chat – Random, and in both cases the effect 
narrows somewhat over time.  However, the effect of Nonogram (relative to Chat – Random) is less 
than half the effect of Chat – Endogenous. 
Formal statistical analysis yields similar conclusions.  We modify Model 2 from Table 2 in two ways, 
adding the data from Nonogram and adding an interaction between Rounds 11 – 40 and Nonogram as an 
independent variable.  The parameter estimate for this new interaction term is 31.50 with a robust 
standard error of 44.49.  This is less than half of the estimate for endogenous roles and nowhere close to 
statistical significance.
13
   
We would hesitate to suggest that none of the effect of endogenous role assignment is due to 
increased cognitive load.  Nonogram does have a positive effect on bids, even if it is weak, and the 
impact on messages about bidding in Nonogram and Chat – Endogenous is consistent with an effect due 
to increased cognitive load.  But it is difficult to argue that solving nonograms should increase cognitive 
load less than choosing roles.   
                                                 
13
 The difference between the estimates for “Rounds 11 – 40 x Nonogram” and “Rounds 11 – 40 x Endogenous 
Roles” is also not statistically significant (p = 0.340).  If we use expected profits as the dependent variable, the 
estimate for the interaction term is -10.32 with a standard error of 16.02.  This is not statistically significant. 
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A likely difference between the Nonogram treatment and the treatments with endogenous role 
selection is that role selection is freighted with emotional baggage which is absent in Nonogram.  Our 
second follow-up treatment, Emotion, addresses this by studying two questions.  First, does endogenous 
role selection generate selection into the Buyer role on individual characteristics beyond those 
documented in Table 3?  We focus on psychological characteristics such as overconfidence, risk 
preferences, positive and negative reciprocity, a desire for control, and self-efficacy.  Second, are there 
differences in the emotional state of Buyers and Sellers?  For example, do Buyers feel happier with their 
role than Sellers?  Do Buyers feel more pressure than Sellers or more responsible? 
Rounds 1 – 10 of the Emotion treatment were the same as in the other treatments.  Prior to role 
selection, we paused the experiment to ask subjects, “Compared to other buyers in this session how much 
money do you think you earned in [Rounds 1 – 10]?”14  Subjects were asked to pick a quartile of the 
distribution and were paid an additional euro if they correctly identified their quartile.  They were not told 
if they had correctly identified their quartile until the conclusion of the experiment.  We use the difference 
between a subject’s guess about their performance and their actual performance as our measure of 
overconfidence. 
Selection of roles in the Emotion treatment was identical to the Chat – Endogenous treatment.  After 
role selection was finished and before Rounds 11 – 40, we paused the session to conduct a number of 
questionnaires (see the online appendix for full details of all questionnaires).  Subjects were not told in 
advance that this pause would occur.   
The first block of questions dealt with subjects’ emotional state of mind.  We began by asking them 
whether they felt responsible for their teammates’ earnings in Rounds 11 – 40 and whether they felt 
pressure to earn a high amount of money.  We then asked them about “how you felt when you were told 
what role (Buyer or Seller) you would be assigned.”  They were asked to fill out a seven point Likert 
                                                 
14
 We intentionally avoided asking about their bids as we did not wish to suggest that lower bids were better. 
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scale ranging from “Not at all” to “Very intense” for eleven emotions: fear, envy, anger, sadness, 
happiness, shame, irritation, contempt, joy, jealousy, and surprise. 
The next segment of the questionnaires gathered information about subjects’ personal characteristics, 
including locus of control, self-efficacy, risk preferences, trust, and positive and negative reciprocity.  The 
questionnaire for locus of control (Levenson, 1981) measures how much control individuals feel over 
what happens to them. Self-efficacy captures an individual’s belief that they are (or are not) capable of 
accomplishing tasks across a broad variety of settings (Chen et al., 2001). Self-efficacy and locus of 
control do not measure the same trait but are related to each other, and indeed are correlated in our 
sample. 
Our measures of risk preferences, trust, and positive and negative reciprocity were all drawn from 
Falk et al. (2016).  In all cases, we used a qualitative question (see appendix for details) and a 
hypothetical choice in an experimental game to measure a specific trait.
15
 We present only the latter here 
for reasons of succinctness, but adding the qualitative questions would not change any of our conclusions.  
For risk preferences, we elicited subjects’ certainty equivalent for a gamble with a 50 percent chance of 
paying 300 euros and a 50 percent chance of getting zero.  Trust was measured by asking how much a 
subject would be willing to send as the first player in a trust game, with amounts ranging from 0 to 20 
euros.  Positive reciprocity was measured by asking subjects about their behavior as second mover in a 
trust game, conditional on the first mover having sent 5, 10, 15, or 20 euros.  Negative reciprocity was 
measured via a hypothetical question about a subject’s minimum acceptable offer (MAO) in an ultimatum 
game with a 100 euro pie. 
The final item in the survey elicited a subject’s willingness to pay for their assigned role.  Possible 
values ranged from -1.60 to 1.60 euro.  Payments were framed as the amount a subject would have to be 
paid to switch roles, with a negative number indicating that the subject would be willing to pay in order to 
                                                 
15
 Falk et al. (2016) document that these are good predictors of behavior in incentivized choice experiments. 
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switch roles.  Higher numbers mean that the subject has a higher preference for their role over the other 
role. 
After the survey, the session concluded with Rounds 11 – 40, conducted in the same manner as Chat 
– Endogenous.  The Emotion treatment was run with 114 new subjects (in six sessions) to see how 
endogenous role selection affected Sellers and Buyers with respect to their emotions, overconfidence, 
economic preferences, and feelings of responsibility. Rounds 11-40 play no role in generating these 
insights, but we played out Rounds 11 – 40 to avoid deceiving the subjects (instructions were identical to 
the Chat – Endogenous treatment, so subjects were told there would be an additional 30 rounds after 
selection of roles).  The resulting data cannot be directly compared to the other treatments due to the 
presence of multiple confounds.  Not only was there a long delay for the questionnaires (20 – 25 minutes) 
that was not present for the other treatments, but a number of the questions ask specifically about 
subjects’ emotions and how they feel about their assigned role in the game.  It is easy to imagine that the 
long delay gave subjects an additional opportunity to think about the takeover game as well as affecting 
their emotional state, and that the questions about subjects’ emotions affected their emotional states.  As 
such we largely dispense with a discussion of these data. 
Table 5 about here 
Table 5 summarizes the results of the survey.  We have a number of redundant measures (e.g., two 
measures of risk preferences, two measures of negative reciprocity, etc.).  In the interest of brevity, in all 
cases we report the measure that corresponds to choices in a laboratory experiment rather than the 
qualitative measures.  However, our conclusions about differences (or the lack thereof) between Buyers 
and Sellers would be identical using the qualitative measures.  To boil down the measures of locus of 
control and self-efficacy, we have run factor analysis.  In both cases there was only a single factor with an 
eigenvalue greater than one, providing the variable reported in Table 5.  We took a similar approach with 
the eleven questions about a subject’s emotional state when they learned their role.  In this case there 
were two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, substantially so in both cases, so we report results for 
both factors in Table 5.  For all variables we report the average values for Sellers and Buyers.  The final 
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column of Table 5 reports the z-scores, first from a Wilcoxon signed rank test of the null hypothesis that 
the median difference between the Buyer and Seller in a pair equals zero, and second a Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, because for some of the variables, particularly those dealing with emotions, the paired tests 
(with signed ranks) are not obviously appropriate.  For this reason, we present the z-scores from both tests 
(paired and unpaired), which actually yield very similar results.
 
 
Looking at the variables that examine selection by personal characteristics, the only significant 
difference is on negative reciprocity as measured by the subject’s MAO in an ultimatum game.  The 
MAO is significantly lower for Buyers than Sellers, indicating greater negative reciprocity.  This is the 
single strongest result in the survey.  None of the other personal characteristics (risk preferences, trust, 
positive reciprocity, locus of control, and self-efficacy) even come close to showing a significant 
difference between Buyers and Sellers. 
Turning to measures relating to subjects’ emotions, there are significant differences between Buyers 
and Sellers on the second factor for the emotions and willingness to pay.  To better interpret the result 
about Emotion 2, we need to look at the factor loadings.  The three items getting the largest factor 
loadings are happiness and joy, which are highly correlated with each other and receive positive weight in 
this factor, and envy which receives negative weight.  We have broken out these individual emotions 
below Emotion 2.  Buyers are less happy and joyful than Sellers (albeit not significantly) and more 
envious.  The other place where there is a significant difference is willingness to pay to keep one’s role, 
where Buyers are significantly less willing to pay for their role.  One additional point deserves mention – 
Buyers feel less responsibility than Sellers.  This difference misses significance for the signed rank test 
but comes up weakly significant on a simple t-test for paired differences.   
Combining the various results from Table 5, the data tells a straightforward story.  Subjects assigned 
endogenously to the Buyer role are, for lack of a better term, relatively grumpy about it.  Subjects who 
select into the Buyer role are significantly more likely to want to punish people who have harmed them 
(negative reciprocity).  With endogenous role assignment, it is the Seller, not chance, who is responsible 
for them getting the Buyer role.  While we don’t think Buyers are purposefully sabotaging Sellers, it is 
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easy to imagine that they aren’t terribly motivated to try their hardest to figure out the best bidding 
strategy, which is also reflected in a lower level of feeling responsible.
16
   
Conclusion 7: Our two additional treatments reveal that cognitive load is most likely only of minor 
importance, but endogenous role assignment has a negative psychological and emotional effect on 
Buyers. 
 
7. Conclusion  
The primary purpose of our study was to investigate the relationship between how roles are assigned 
within a work team and team performance when teams consist of pairs where one member has a 
considerably more difficult task than the other member. We found that teams perform better when team 
members can communicate with each other and share information and discuss strategies. When team 
members are also allowed to assign roles endogenously, this feature has a positive effect on role 
assignment, leading to assigning the more able persons to the more difficult Buyer role. However, 
controlling for this selection, we find that endogenous role assignment increases Buyers’ bids, completely 
counteracting the helpful effects of selection.  
It is common wisdom that more employee involvement is better, and there is certainly some truth to 
these assertions (see Ichniowski and Shaw, 1999), but our results suggest that employee involvement in 
role assignment can be counter-productive.  Involving employees makes it possible to take advantage of 
their private information about co-workers, consistent with improved role assignment in our experiment, 
but also increases the number of tasks that the employees need to perform. If there is interference between 
                                                 
16
 Running regressions analogous to the models used in Table 2, the relationship between bids (expected profits) and 
willingness to pay is negative (positive) and significant (estimated parameters are -77.57 for bids and 25.95 for 
expected profits with standard errors of 35.79 and 9.12, respectively).  The measures of emotions are not 
predictive for bids or expected profits.  These regression results should be interpreted cautiously given the long 
delay between the end of role assignment and the start of Rounds 11 – 40. 
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tasks, processes for assigning roles that make less use of employees’ input may improve performance by 
allowing them to focus on more critical tasks.  Our point is not that we have identified the ideal way to 
assign roles – this is a topic for future research – but rather that the process used to assign roles matters 
beyond getting the most able individuals assigned to the most critical roles.  Ideally, the process used for 
assignment of roles would assign the right person to the right role without disrupting performance at the 
employees’ primary task.   
A final question is why endogenous role assignment has a negative effect on Buyers’ performance.  
This effect was unexpected, so our initial experiments weren’t designed to answer this question per se.  
We therefore ran two new treatments.  First, we conjectured that increased cognitive load could be driving 
the negative effect of endogenous role assignment. When we tested this conjecture with a follow-up 
treatment where subjects solved puzzles while discussing how to bid, the effect was in the predicted 
direction but modest. Cognitive load may play some role, but our data do not suggest it is primarily 
responsible for explaining the negative effect of endogenous role assignment on Buyers’ performance.  A 
second conjecture was that endogenous role assignment affected subjects’ emotional state in a way that 
affected Buyers’ choices.  The data from our second follow-up treatment supports this conjecture.  
Endogenous role assignment selects for subjects who have a relatively high tendency towards negative 
reciprocity.  Buyers are relatively unhappy with their role and feel less responsible.  It is easy to see how 
this could lead to Buyers being less inclined to engage in discussion of the game (in the treatment with 
chat) and less willing to expend effort thinking about how best to bid. 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Bidding Strategies and Their Profitability 
Bid 
Value 1.5 * Expected 
Value if Accepted 
Ever Profitable? 
90 600 1200 
Bid < 90 Reject Reject Reject N/A No 
90 ≤ Bid < 135 Accept Reject Reject 135 Yes 
135 ≤ Bid < 600 Accept Reject Reject 135 No 
600 ≤ Bid < 900 Accept Accept Reject 517.5 Yes 
900 ≤ Bid < 1200 Accept Accept Reject 517.5 No 
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1200 ≤ Bid < 1800 Accept Accept Accept 945 Yes 
Bid ≥ 1800 Accept Accept Accept 945 No 
 
 
 
Table 2: Regressions for Treatment Effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent Variable Bid Bid E(Profit) Bid Bid E(Profit) 
Fixed Effects Team Buyer Buyer Team Buyer Buyer 
Rounds 11 - 40 
-69.40*** 
(22.63) 
-95.30*** 
(24.07) 
25.21*** 
(8.93) 
-24.07 
(46.37) 
-41.67 
(47.68) 
0.043 
(15.99) 
Rounds 11 – 40  
* Control 
-31.99 
(29.65) 
-6.094 
(30.76) 
1.96 
(10.51) 
-34.34 
(29.70) 
-8.74 
(30.47) 
3.22 
(10.23) 
Rounds 11 – 40  
* Chat 
-69.63*** 
(26.59) 
-68.87** 
(29.19) 
16.16* 
(9.76) 
-65.50** 
(26.32) 
-64.08** 
(28.60) 
13.70 
(9.28) 
Rounds 11 – 40 * 
Endogenous Roles 
12.50 
(26.59) 
72.91** 
(29.19) 
-23.86** 
(9.58) 
2.48 
(25.91) 
60.74** 
(28.41) 
-18.49
** 
(9.20) 
Rounds 11 – 40  
* Gender 
   
-64.25*** 
(22.92) 
-76.60*** 
(24.07) 
35.67*** 
(7.95) 
Rounds 11 – 40  
* Age 
   
1.05 
(5.29) 
-0.23 
(5.49) 
0.30 
(1.83) 
Rounds 11 – 40  
* Math Score 
   
-1.07 
(11.01) 
-8.16 
(11.59) 
0.33 
(3.21) 
Rounds 11 – 40  
* German Score 
   
-9.89 
(13.25) 
1.18 
(13.04) 
2.78 
(4.29) 
Notes: All regressions include 16,480 observations from 592 individuals (352 teams).  To identify the 
fixed effects, we are using data from all 40 rounds.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
Table 3: Median Characteristics of Buyers and Sellers when Roles are Endogenously Assigned 
 No Chat – Endogenous  Chat – Endogenous 
 Buyer Seller |z-score|  Buyer Seller |z-score| 
Age (in categories)
a
 5.0 5.0 0.94 5.0 4.0 1.03 
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Gender
b 
.317 .483 1.83
* 
.533 .467 0.69 
Math Score
c
 2.0 2.0 0.62 2.0 2.0 0.41 
German Score
c
 2.0 2.0 0.58 2.0 2.5 1.40 
Earnings 
Rounds 1 – 10d 
67.0 -642.5 4.13
*** 
-17.5 -137.5 0.19 
Expected Profits -20.1 -49.1 2.70
*** 
-22.3 -40.5 1.16 
Bid, Rounds. 1 - 10 318.5 447.2 2.63
** 
306.7 400.5 1.79
* 
 
Notes: Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively (Wilcoxon signed ranks tests). 
 
a
 Age was coded as follows: 0=18 years or younger; 1=19 years; 2=20 years; 3=21 years; 4=22 years; 
5=23 years; 6=24 years; 7=25 years; 8=26 years or older. 
b
 Gender was coded as follows: 0 = Male; 1 = Female. 
c
 Lower grades are better in the Austrian school system. Grades were coded from 1 to 5. 
d
 Earnings do not include the starting capital of 3000 experimental points. 
 
Table 4: Does the Buyer’s Identity Matter? 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable 
Average Bid 
Rounds 11 – 40 
Expected Profits 
Rounds 11 – 40 
Chat 
-83.71
*** 
(26.63) 
23.03
* 
(12.05) 
No Chat * 
Buyer Low Bidder / High Expected Profit 
-106.85
***
 
(19.92) 
33.98
*** 
(11.77) 
Chat * 
Buyer Low Bidder / High Expected Profit 
-35.87
**
 
(18.19) 
17.30
*
 
(10.36) 
Notes: The dependent variable is a Buyer’s average bid for Rounds 11 – 40, yielding a single observation 
per Buyer.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
Table 5: Survey Results by Role 
Variable Sellers Buyers 
Wilcoxon Signed-
Ranks Test 
Wilcoxon Rank-
Sum Test 
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Overconfidence 0.018 -0.228 1.09 1.00 
Responsible 3.95 3.65 1.42 1.42 
Pressure 3.32 3.33 0.12 0.28 
Emotion 1 -0.053 0.053 0.39 0.29 
Emotion 2 0.173 -0.173 1.71
* 
1.99
**
 
Happy 3.44 2.89 1.39 1.61 
Joy 3.61 3.16 1.22 1.45 
Envy 1.18 1.67 2.60
***
 2.46
**
 
Self-efficacy -0.076 0.076 0.97 1.26 
Locus of Control 0.022 -0.022 0.12 0.33 
Risk (Lotteries) 1.10 € 1.06 € 0.61 0.96 
Ultimatum (MAO) 31.90 € 24.00 € 2.88*** 3.16*** 
Trust Game (Send) 10.4 € 10.4 € 0.87 0.82 
Trust Game Return (High - Low) 24.6 € 23.6 € 0.80 0.09 
Willingness to Pay to Keep Role 1.00 € 0.72 € 1.83* 2.01** 
* 
/ 
** 
/ 
***
 indicates significance at 10% / 5% / 1%-level. 
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Notes: The bins are taken from Table 1. Both in the left and the right panel the three most frequent bins are those 
that can ever be profitable. 
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Notes: In Rounds 1 – 10 all subjects are included (because all subjects played in the role of Buyer against 
computerized Sellers), while in rounds 11 – 40 only the Buyers in each team are included (except for the Control 
treatment where all participating subjects were in the role of Buyers in Rounds 11 - 40). 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure displays average bids from the two treatments with random role assignment (i.e., Chat – Random 
and No Chat – Random; see solid lines) along with average bids from the subset of teams in these treatments where 
the low bidder in Rounds 1 – 10 became the Buyer (dashed lines). The latter subset of teams is denoted as perfect 
selection. 
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Notes: For the treatments with endogenous role assignment, the average bids in Rounds 1 – 10 are adjusted to equal 
those in the paired treatment with random role assignment.  In subsequent ten round blocks the average bids are 
changed as they did in the real data from the endogenous role assignment treatments.  The figure therefore shows 
how the data would evolve if endogenous role assignment had no effect on role assignment (yielding equal starting 
positions), leaving only the effect on learning. 
 
 
Notes: This figure compares the average bid in Rounds 11 – 40 for teams where the teammate who bid (strictly) 
lower on average in rounds 1 – 10 becomes the Buyer with teams where the teammate who bid lower becomes the 
Seller. Note that panel “No Chat” includes treatments No Chat – Endogenous and No Chat – Random, and that 
panel “Chat” includes treatments Chat – Endogenous and Chat – Random. 
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Figure 6: 6 x 6 Nonogram 
 
  
A B C D E F 
  
 
4 
2 
2 
2 
3 
 
3 
4 
1 
1 
4 
I 1   2   x  x x 
II 4  x x x x  
III 2   3 x x  x x x 
IV 1   4 x  x x x x 
V 3   1 x x x   x 
VI 3   2 x x x  x x 
Notes: Subjects got an empty Nonogram (inside the 6 x 6 grid) and had to mark the correct cells with an “X”. The 
figure shows the correct solution. 
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Notes: The construction of Figure 7 parallels that of Figure 4.  It shows average bids of subjects assigned the Buyer 
role for Rounds 11 – 40 broken down by ten round blocks.  The average bids in Rounds 1 – 10 are adjusted to equal 
those in Chat – Random.  In subsequent ten round blocks the average bids are changed as they did in the real data. 
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